Coping with COP29

Conference of States Parties (COPs) serve the process of periodical treaty review and implementation. COPs under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) remain so far the only game in town when it comes to deciding multilaterally on our global climate destiny. These summits can be buzzing with excitement and activities while simultaneously grinding to a halt for several key agenda items. Towards the end of this year’s COP, the hustle and buzzing had faded mid-way through the second week, to be replaced with the wait for new texts on all agenda items. Quiet final days until the delayed closing plenary on the 24 November, at 4:30am. Little was known about the final schedule, and only general emails with information about the extended opening hours of food outlets indicated that more time was required to produce some outcomes in long sessions behind closed doors.  

In his final speech, UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell shared a positive outlook when he stated that the “new finance goal is an insurance policy for humanity”. The following sheds some light on the mandate and size of COPs and offers some brief reflections on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance and on the now fully operational market-based instruments, agenda items for which decisions could be adopted in the end.

1. The Mandate of COPs: Reviewing obligations on the “basis of all information available”

The States Parties at COPs are legally obliged to keep under regular review the implementation of the UNFCCC. The mandate is clearly outlined in Article 7 of the UNFCCC, and it also applies to the Paris Agreement’s meeting of the Parties (CMA) as the Paris Agreement is one of the “related legal instruments” that the Conference of the Parties has adopted. Countries are called to periodically examine their obligations and the institutional arrangements under the UNFCCC. This is important to note: COPs are not “just” about policy, they are about reviewing legal obligations and legal progress, to assess:

“[…] on the basis of all information made available […] the implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved.”

Accordingly, this year’s 29^th conference (COP29) should have reviewed and advanced obligations on the basis of all information available to it. This requires to consider the scientific evidence that has been provided in various recent reports, including the 2024 UNEP Gap Report, the IPCC AR6 Reports, and the so-called NDC Synthesis Report released in October 2024. The latter report summarises the effects that all nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of countries would have on our current climate change trajectory, assuming that these pledges would be fully implemented. The UNFCCC Secretariat provides this update each year ahead of COP, to enable countries to fulfil their mandate and to review the legal obligations in light of the science.

It is important to note that these scientific reports conclude that we have the following shortfall when comparing the actual emissions and the emission reductions required for scenarios commensurate with the internationally endorsed temperature threshold of limiting warming to 1.5°C. Total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be

“(a) In 2025, 54.0 per cent higher than in 1990 (34.4 Gt CO2 eq), 11.3 per cent

higher than in 2010 (47.6 Gt CO2 eq) and approximately the same as in 2019 (52.9 Gt CO2 eq). […]

(b) In 2030, 49.8 per cent higher than in 1990, 8.3 per cent higher than in 2010

and 2.6 per cent lower than in 2019.”

The IPCC stated in the contribution of Working Group III to the AR6 that in scenarios of limiting warming to 1.5°C (with over 50 per cent likelihood by 2100) with no or limited overshoot over the course of the century, that GHG emissions must be reduced by 43 (34–60) per cent by 2030 relative to the 2019 level. There is still a possibility that global emissions will peak before 2030. However, the NDC Synthesis Report is clear that the absolute difference in the level of emissions by 2030, according to the latest NDCs, and these IPCC scenarios, is “sizeable”.

2. The Business of COPs

Who is in charge of reviewing progress and obligations, who negotiates? According to data released so far, 66778 in person and around 3975 virtual participants registered for COP29. This includes 33158 representatives (excluding “overflow” delegates who are not authorised to speak on behalf of their country) of 198 State Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) and 195 State Parties to the Paris Agreement. Delegation sizes vary significantly, for example, the host country, Azerbaijan, had the strongest representation with 995 members and additional 1,234 overflow delegates. Before COP28 in Dubai, Azerbaijan usually only had six delegates. The second largest delegation came from Brazil with 1914 participants, followed by Turkey with 1892 delegates. Turkey has a keen interest to be well represented, as the country has applied to host COP31, after next year’s COP30 in Brazil. The UK was represented by 54 delegates and additional 416 overflow members. There are much smaller delegations, for example, Iceland’s delegation had ten delegates and 37 overflow members. A strong delegation comes with obvious benefits in respect of presence on the ground, information collection and sharing, preparation of interventions, and coverage across the meeting rooms.  

Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) faced difficulties to obtain more than one badge, especially universities in the Global North. Around 9881 delegates from NGOs registered, in addition to 3575 media delegates.

3. The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance:

Climate finance was a defining theme of COP29 from the very beginning. In the end, a new decision was adopted, setting the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) of USD 300 billion per year by 2035. Parties reaffirmed that developed country Parties will be taking the lead in providing financial resources to developing country Parties, and decided that the new goal will support the implementation of developing country Parties’ NDCs, their national adaptation plans, and contribution to increasing and accelerating ambition. The decision also calls on all actors to “work together to enable the scaling up of financing to developing country Parties for climate action” to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. Undoubtedly, much hope must be placed by all Parties in the private sector. The new NCQG replaces the previous goal of 100 billion annually by 2020 that was formally agreed in Decision 1/CP.21 para. 53, but already envisaged at the 15th Conference of Parties COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009.

The gap between the NCQG and financial needs is significant, and the means of financing (grant/loans) were highly contentious. Parties highlight in their decision that the costed needs reported in developing countries’ NDCs amount to around USD 5.1-6.8 trillion up until 2030 or USD 455-584 billion per year. In addition, adaptation finance needs are estimated at USD 215-387 billion annually for up until 2030. COP29 launched the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”, that aims at addressing both, the scaling up of climate finance to developing country Parties to support low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways and implement the nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans, and to widen the available means of financing, including grant financing, concessional and non-debt creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space.

The OECD found in its sevenths assessment report in relation to the progress towards the UNFCCC finance goals, published on 29 May 2024, that in 2022 developed countries “provided and mobilised a total of USD 115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries, exceeding the annual USD 100 billion goal for the first time.” Of that amount, public finance accounted for around 80% of the total in 2022, increased from USD 38 billion in 2013 to USD 91.6 billion in 2022. Adaptation finance reached USD 32.4 billion in 2022, thus the majority of around 60% of finance is absorbed by mitigation. The private sector’s contribution grew by 52% in 2022.

4. Carbon Markets to the Rescue?

A key mechanism that aims at increasing private investment in the green economy is Article 6 Paris Agreement. There are two options under that provision: the cooperative approaches that are directly accessible for projects between countries, through implementing agreements, or private entities and countries; and the Sustainability Mechanism that operates under the oversight of a Supervisory Body. COP29 succeeded in adopting decisions and further rules for outstanding elements under both instruments, on matters relating to the cooperative approaches under Article 6 paragraph 2 and on the guidance on the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement.

At the very beginning of COP29, an early breakthrough had been reported for the mechanism under Article 6 paragraph 4. However, the agreed methodologies had at that stage only been adopted by the Supervisory Body which is fully accountable to the CMA. These methodologies and standards are intended to provide the basis for claiming and assessing of creditable emission reductions or removals. Parties were still required to adopt a decision and approve the rules.

Negotiations under both options were technical and challenging. Even though some fundamental rules existed already, adopted at COP26 in Glasgow (Decision 2/CMA.3 and Decision 3/CMA.3), there were more detailed issues that required further negotiations and decision-making by Parties. These included, among others, the registration and tracking of emission credits in national and UNFCCC registers, the inter-operationality between registers, the authorisation process for transferable credits, and the application of baseline scenarios to demonstrate the additionality of emission reductions achieved through projects.

While the decisions that now operationalise global carbon markets are welcome to the extent that the instruments are operational, some caution is necessary. Concerns in relation to methodological consistency and avoidance of double counting persist. Internationally tradeable carbon credits must be real, verified and additional, as well as transparent, conservative, credible and reduce emissions to “below business as usual”, according to existing rules. These criteria are designed to instil some discipline for markets – but they require further scientific and legal clarifications when applied in concrete scenarios. There is no room in the global carbon budget for low-quality credits that compromise on legal certainty, transactional transparency and scientific accuracy. Checks on consistency and the determination of “significant and persistent” inconsistency must be stringent.

The stakes are high – the global carbon market that will emerge from Article 6 enables Parties for the first time to trade with emission reductions and then demonstrate compliance with their NDCs, by using a combination of domestic and internationally traded emission reductions. Double counting or trading with merely “imagined” emission reductions will mask non-compliance with countries’ climate targets. Therefore, Article 6 rules determine that emission reductions that are transferred from one country to another, can only be used by one State Party. To avoid double usage of credits, the selling State Party must undertake a “corresponding adjustment”. It means that the seller’s emissions increase, while the emissions of the buying Party will decrease after the transaction. Only one Party can use the credits to demonstrate compliance with its national climate targets. If carbon credits are real, verified, measurable and additional, then cooperative approaches could leverage the potential of achieving additional emission reductions and enhance ambition in mitigation and adaptation. Yet to avoid greenwashing, existing must be applied consistently, in line with the legal principle of good faith and backed up by science, and it will be important to not lose sight of the potentially rather limited life-time of credits – not all traded emission reductions will be permanent.

Meanwhile, some of the impacts of climate change are already unavoidable and/or irreversible. Devastating effects can only be limited by real, deep, rapid, and sustained global greenhouse gas emission reductions. Overshooting 1.5°C will result in additional irreversible adverse impacts on certain ecosystems such as polar, mountain, and coastal ecosystems, impacted by ice-sheet melt, glacier melt, and by accelerating and higher committed sea level rise. The science is clear that we cannot afford accounting errors of the global carbon market, instead, additional caution and highest standards of due diligence are required as the world embraces the economic theory of reducing emissions where it costs less to do so.  

Going forward, cooperation between governments, with private sector actors, and collaboration with academic experts remain critical to ensure that legal and quality standards and transparency are not compromised. COP29 has kept the show on the road but it has also reminded us of the importance of strong climate leadership and diverse representation of countries and NGOs on the ground. There are very unfortunate delays, once more.

To find out more about Durham University’s research expertise in this field and how it can benefit your organisation, please contact the JusTN0W project team through Kate Morris, Senior Business Development Manager at kathryn.l.morris@durham.ac.uk or Dr Owen Boyle at owen.d.boyle@durham.ac.uk.