The Local Turn and Beyond – From New Ontological and Epistemological Concerns to a Phenomenology of the Post-Conflict Everyday:

A Plea For A Reconceptualization Of Peace- And Statebuilding On The Basis Of The Case Study Of Post-Dayton Bosnia And Herzegovina

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Abstract

The continued importance of peacebuilding and the necessity to find a "best practice" becomes most apparent when one considers current developments in Syria or Sudan. A recent advancement in the field of conflict studies' – especially peacebuilding's – "best practices" has been the "local turn" which developed over the past 25 years out of an increasing discontentment with liberal approaches to peacebuilding. This paper explores this turn's metaphysical journey, uncovering its ontological and epistemological assumptions which foster its "bottom-up" approach. Whilst great progress is shown to have been made by acknowledging the complexity and plurality of post-conflict environments and phenomena, results remain limited. Indeed, linear, normative, and static models still distort the peacebuilding practice's orientation to post-conflict phenomena. This paper argues that this is due, not so much to the understanding of phenomena, but rather the understanding of what it is to *understand* phenomena. Using the case of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina as a substantiation of the arguments put forth, an explanation of the ways in which both the Civil Society Development and the Local Agency approach have been unable to fulfil their aims of local legitimacy, efficiency, and agency, is provided. Using phenomenological intakes from philosophy, this paper suggests that placing human consciousness and experiences at the core of knowledge processes, fosters a better understanding of what it means to live in, navigate around, and manage a post-conflict environment. Which methods – personal or at the level of practice – will best implement such a change of thought is left at the discretion of the peacebuilder/researcher. Whilst this sounds like a "non-practical" solution, a "turn towards phenomenology" might lead towards acknowledging that there currently is no unique grand narrative which could inspire straightforward peacebuilding methods. Rather, peacebuilding pursuits should embrace their much more intuitive, scattered, non-linear, informal, and trial-and-error nature and origin.

About the Author

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BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CS	Civil Society
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development – United Kingdom
DPs	Displaced People
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
OHR	Office for the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina

1 Introduction

International peacebuilding has experienced, over the past 25 years, a gradual turn towards "the local". While the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report did not mention the word "local" once, the World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report* mentioned it 382 times (Mac Ginty 2015: 840). The concept emerged out of an increasing discontentment with liberal approaches to peacebuilding,[1] in light of the failures of peacebuilding missions in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Bosnia. It was based on the acknowledgment that effective and sustainable peacebuilding required the emancipation and inclusion of local agency, fostering a legitimate and authentic peace through widespread civic participation and civil society (CS) engagement – peace as bottom-up, rather than top-down (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Paffenholz 2015).

Peacebuilding is built around, and nourished by, metaphysical assumptions and queries (i.e. explaining the fundamental nature of "being" and the world that encompasses it), which are underpinned by epistemological and ontological claims (Randazzo, 2015). As a practice it is concerned with notions of cause and effect regarding the dynamics of the post-conflict reality (Chandler 2015: 70), exploring how society operates, what kind of governance is present, how individuals navigate, avoid, or instigate conflict (Mac Ginty 2014: 549), etc., so as to develop a theory and a policy of change. In the past decades, the discipline has been questioning its metaphysical assumptions, and expressing 'either epistemological humility or epistemological scepticism, or both, when it comes to analysing, narrating or "knowing" the post-conflict environment and people that live within it' (Sabaratnam 2011: 9). Yet, it has so far remained influenced by a success-inhibiting linear (Chandler 2015: 72), normative (Randazzo 2016: 11-12), and static (Schierenbeck 2015: 1026) orientation to peacebuilding and post-conflict phenomena due to, as will be shown, a problematic knowledge process.

This paper explores the metaphysical journey of the local turn. It outlines in Chapters 2 and 3 how every turn sketches the relation between the position of the intervener, the problem under consideration and the society/community being intervened (see

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[1] Strategies linked with a top-down prescriptive model favouring neoliberal market-based economic reforms, the promotion of democracy, and the belief of institutionalisation and rule of law mechanisms as being the driving force for building "peace" in a "modern" state (Newman *et al* 2009: 3).

Figure 1) in terms of ontological presuppositions and epistemological propositions, which are linear, normative, and static. These relations are shaped according to the understandings of the local as legitimacy/efficiency (Chapter 2) or agency (Chapter 3), and epistemological claims regarding cause and effect: endogenous causality (Chapter 2) and management of effect (Chapter 3). Throughout the journey, the argument crystallises around the realisation that the manner knowledge is gained about these ontological and epistemological presuppositions is inherently erroneous. Indeed, as is clarified in Chapter 4, both the ontological and epistemological presuppositions are symptomatic of the Cartesian subject-object divide which continuously plagues processes of knowledge in social sciences. It is argued that it is necessary to transcend this dichotomy and to recognise knowledge as 'rooted in the corporeal dimension of existence that is always situated in concrete lived experience' (Chamberlain 1993: 423),[2] so as to gain a hopefully more sophisticated and realistic orientation towards access to knowledge, which consequently affects how post-conflict phenomena are perceived in analyses and dealt with in practice.

The continued importance of peacebuilding, and the necessity to find a 'best practice', becomes most apparent when one considers recent developments in Syria, Libya and Sudan (see Brahimi, 2007). Yet, it is the continued under-performance of post-conflict states which is of interest here. Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth: Bosnia or BiH) is chosen as empirical example, for two main reasons: 1) Peacebuilding is commonly understood as a practice which happens 'somewhere else' than in the 'West'; the struggles encountered in the field have too often been attributed to the 'otherness' of the 'failed' states' socio-political practices/culture. Due to geographical, cultural, and historical reasons and, potentially political proximity, the case of Bosnia allows to question these taken-for-granted 'Western values' and the related liberal political order. 2) After 20 years there is plenty of empirical evidence and academic research highlighting its meagre impact on the political and social situation and stability. The contribution of this paper is theoretical and philosophical. Empirical examples will only be used to substantiate the arguments put forth.

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[2] On embodiment see Merleau-Ponty (1962[1945]).

2   Peacebuilding: A Theoretical Overview

Within the development field, there is an unsettled discussion regarding the difference and relation between the concepts of peace- and statebuilding. For many development actors, they are mutually exclusive in practice and in theory (Grävingholt, Gänzle, and Ziaja 2009a).[3] Whilst much of this paper is concerned with the relation and position of "the local turn" with/in statebuilding, the usage of the concept of "peacebuilding" will be preferred. This choice lies on the realisation that a sustainable and humane post-conflict everyday requires more than a functioning state. Moreover, critics of "liberal peacebuilding" have expanded the concept into an umbrella term for wider development practices and theories (e.g. Bargués-Pedreny n.d., Heathershaw 2009, Mitchell 2011), now allowing for new conceptualisations of peace (e.g. Krycka's (2012): "peacebuilding from the Inside"), it can be used in reference to pluridimensional approaches to "peace" building.

What a state or peace *is*, and *how* it should be *built* – note the static tone: *is* rather than *become* – are ontologically and epistemologically informed queries. Ontology is the study of what there is, and what it is to be (Lawson 2004). It is '[a]n explicit formal specification of how to represent the objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area of interest and the relationships that hold among them' (Howe 1997, para 2). Peacebuilding's ontology encompasses phenomena such as "Peace" (e.g. interpersonal, intrapersonal, sustainable, environmental, etc.) or "State", "Interventions", "Conflict", etc., asking for example under which conditions peace will exist or a state flourish. Epistemology is the study of knowledge, its extent, how it is acquired, etc. It is concerned with the justification, understanding, and explanation of ontological presuppositions (Alemika 2002). Epistemology is crucial in that it uncovers the assumptions about cause and effect which affect practice, and seeks to remove or unveil normative assumptions and prejudices (Gadamer 2004[1960]).

How the "building" practice has been approached and implemented has evolved over time, remaining nonetheless concerned with mechanisms of causality or linearity. Indeed, within international development, state- and peacebuilding continuously reflect comprehensive 'institutional engineering' (statebuilding) (Bliesemann De Guevara 2009:15) or social

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[3] In this paper, statebuilding is conceptualised as a sub-topic of peacebuilding

engineering (peacebuilding), initiated and then guided or supported by an (often external) actor, as opposed to a "everyday" process.[4]

Traditional liberal peacebuilding was solutionist in that it tried to lay down, via social and political engineering, the structural factors (institutions, neoliberal market economy, "democratic culture", etc.; Chandler 2006) which will *cause* the emergence of "sustainable" peace – linear cause and effect. Instead, the new discourse emerging in the 1970s in parallel to liberal peacebuilding advocates a "local turn" in terms of agency, knowledge, and resources. Central to its development is one of its key thinkers' (Lederach 1997: 94) idea that 'the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture'. Lederach advocated the importance of reconciliation within societies, as well as the collaboration between the local and the international. Over time, the local turn has been integrated into the international peacebuilding agenda[5] via "local ownership" discourses and practices – opening up new peacebuilding ontologies: everyday peace and state-formation.

According to Chandler (2015), the local turn crucially shifted analytical concern from the problematic of causation to focusing on the "management" of *effects*. Being at first understood as "endogenous *causality*", or civil society development, the local turn gradually came to be more "critical" (Chandler 2015:75). It aimed to promote a human-centred, agency-focused, and less 'efficiency/capacity-oriented' understanding of peacebuilding, revealing multiple ontologies of peace and agency (Randazzo 2016: 11), thus intending to move away from normativity and staticity. Metaphysically, causal relations seemed far too complex for being grasped by theory, and engineered by policies, requesting greater epistemological humility as it acknowledged that interventions always have unintended side effects (Randazzo 2016: 71).

Yet, the literature on peacebuilding remained indebted to (other forms of) linearity, normativity, and staticity. Consequently, parallel to other "local turn" strands, new, scattered innovative insights are emerging which distance themselves from these three orientations (e.g. Van Houtum et al. 2005; Sabaratnam 2011; Krycka 2012). As a point of convergence, they show diverse phenomenological insights. Their most important contribution to practice is to

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[4] See Bliesemann de Guevara's (2010) *state-formation.*
[5] An example: United Nations Development Group (2014), *Localizing the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Dialogues on Implementation*. Available at: http://localizingthesdgs.org/library/view/37 [Accessed: 17 November 2016].

(slowly) deconstruct conceptualisations of phenomena such as the Cartesian subject-object dichotomies. Focusing on the meaningfulness and normativity inherent in every experience and activity, and deeply embedded in the social reality or life-world, they aim to clarify how beings experience, feel, and relate to their environment and how they shape, and are shaped by it. What remains to be done is to transcend the Cartesian divide more systemically. Indeed, whilst these new insights have altered the descriptions and representations of phenomena, the problem is not simply to understand phenomena, but firstly to understand what it is to *understand* phenomena. Future theories and concepts may benefit from starting, as Husserl (1960[1931]) and his followers stressed, with placing 'human beings and their consciousness and experiences at the centre of the knowledge process' (Morçöl 2005: 5). As such, the local turn would not simply be concerned with changing 'the way in which peacebuilding is carried out, but the very epistemological and ontological premises that form the corpus of knowledge employed in thinking about peace' (Randazzo 2015: 90).

This brief introduction to the analytical concepts and terminology used throughout this paper has laid the ground for the next three chapters. To understand the value of a phenomenological approach presented in chapter 4, it is firstly necessary to explore how and why the hitherto used approaches, despite developments, seemingly remain unconvincing. The first step of this journey will be the deconstruction of the validity of normative understandings of the local as "legitimacy" and "efficiency".


Figure 1: Sketches of different ontologies of post-Conflict reality and how the elements relate. The boxes signify that the content is a rigidly defined concept. The circles represent realms of actions. The arrows symbolise authority and power, and causality.

3 The Local as Civil Society Development for Legitimacy and Efficiency: Endogenous Causality

This chapter argues that the liberal meta-narrative of the first turn – with its normative understanding of the local as "legitimacy" and "efficiency" – falls short of giving an accurate account of the post-conflict reality, as it engages in a linear and reductive understanding of peacebuilding, misconceiving what "genuine" legitimacy and "efficiency" are beyond the "Western" and the "liberal" lens.

The United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda has been one of many international agendas which acknowledges the importance of "localisation", describing it as 'a means to make the Post-2015 global discussions relevant to local populations in a framework of greater ownership' (UN 2014). Holding civil society as the "most significant" driver of peacebuilding was motivated by liberal and neo-liberal development discourses (Hughes et al. 2015: 819; Chandler 2015), i.e. a meta-narrative legitimising a 'specific manner of "knowing" (epistemology) and being-in-the-world (ontology), [with] specific implications for the manner in which human development, emancipation and change are understood' (Randazzo 2015: 142). The promotion of democratisation was perceived as the supreme political and "moral" aspiration of any political system (Pouligny 2005: 498; Van Tongeren et al. 2005: 9), and the only condition under which the liberal ideals of human rationality, autonomy, liberty, and agency could be fulfilled. Neo-liberalism's high scepticism of state interference in everyday-life affairs, inclined interveners to collaborate with NGOs which were thought most capable of articulating needs politically-independently, particularly crucial in civil war-ridden countries, such as Bosnia (Fagan 2005: 406).

Whilst not presenting a shift in the foundational epistemology of peacebuilding, the local turn increasingly acknowledged the existence of various epistolog*ies*. For the first time, civil society was credited for having a better knowledge of the society intervened in, as it is constituted by it (Abiew and Keating 2004). Not only would this increase efficiency, but also legitimacy, as citizens are more likely to grant it authority than they would to foreign actors (the extent to which this is true is debatable). Civil society itself was conceived as bearing bottom-up force. Indeed, it is defined in the literature as being (1) 'a range of organisational structures, [expressed as] self-organisation, independence, privacy and self-governance'; (2) 'a space where citizens…work to realise individual and common interests'; (3) 'a space within which CS actors…mediate between government or public authorities, the private sector and

citizens to ensure social [and political rights]' and holding the state accountable; and (4) 'a web of social, cultural and functional relationships which can act as a "societal glue"…and develop a democratic culture of tolerance, moderation and compromise' (Chandler 2007: 79). The agency-vocabulary used for its definition (e.g. self-governance, work to realise, act, develop, etc.), is directed towards establishing normatively adequate prerequisites which will lead to peace, security and efficiency: an "endogenous causality".

Civil society's means of "endogenous causality" reconceptualises the relationship between local and international actors (see Figure 1). Indeed, the UN Report on "Localising the post-2015 development agenda", which summarises prevalent views of liberal development, linguistically portrays the international community as either a guide or supporter of peacebuilding: '*involve* stakeholders', 'voices of stakeholders…be *supported'*, '*make* the Post-2015…*relevant to* local populations', '*identify* key local/territorial *stakeholders'*, etc. This explains the amount of official development assistance funding from OECD countries channelled through and to NGOs, which increased from $4.7bn in 2001 to $19.6bn in 2013 (OECD 2011: 30; 2015: 3).

However, despite new epistemological and ontological shifts, linearity, normativity, and staticity permeated all discourses and theories. The discipline misunderstood the relationship and causal link between different entities, especially civil society's actual power of influencing and shaping policy (Fagan 2005: 406), not being the panacea everyone believes it to be (Belloni 2001:177). Impotent regarding the structural problems facing a country, e.g. corruption, national political stalemate, or legal barriers (e.g. BiH's constitution), 'the mushrooming of local NGOs does not lead per se to the establishment of a healthy civil society, whose long-term positive influence requires the presence of an open, transparent, and responsive state structure' (Belloni 2001: 177-178).

This was widely due to misconceiving the nature of certain entities. For example, the turn granted legitimacy and efficiency to civil society, especially NGOs, solely due to its local "territoriality", which, as Belloni (2001: 169, 174, 178) notes, shows a misunderstanding by international actors as to what *constitutes* the "local". Indeed, NGOs often express a mode of life and aspirations which is 'transnational and bureaucratic in nature, and often far removed from [society's] political and social conditions' (Belloni 2001: 177; see also Duffield 2007), 'creat[ing] a stratum of local elites who become skilled at writing great proposals' (Fukuyama 2001:18). Moreover, it is omitted that civil society is only as "civil" as the society which constitutes it (Paffenholz 2010: 860).

It also seems that the liberal ontology of peacebuilding has omitted the existence of power. NGOs' strong dependence on external funding is not only a way of supporting, but also a way of influencing and controlling *what* projects are being implemented, *how*, and *who* can participate (Belloni 2001: 163; Fagan 2005: 407). An 1998 OSCE Report acknowledges that interventions can distort 'the landscape by not allowing local NGOs to work in areas where they see needs and their own strength, [and] by not funding projects in currently unfashionable areas such as psychosocial work' (OSCE 1998: 8), or potentially sensitive policy areas (Kappler and Richmond 2011: 269). Peacebuilding via civil society widely equates to a 'top-down discourse embellished by rhetoric of bottom-up empowerment' consequently 'hindering rather than fostering participation' (Belloni 2001: 174). Or as Kappler and Richmond (2011: 265) note, civil society 'can be seen as linked to specific normative prescriptions and suggestions about what the "ideal" "civil" society should look like'. In other words, it reiterates, in its ontological and epistemological presuppositions, similar normative assumptions to liberal peacebuilding.

Lastly, the liberal meta-narrative does not question knowledge about civil society, nor its general applicability to countries outside the Western context. Varshney (2002: 44) and Pouligny (2005: 498) argue that in many societies, formal associations that fit the liberal definition of civil society do not exist. Yet, external actors will tend to look for structures representative of it, only finding what they want to see. Or as Kappler and Richmond (2011: 265) recount: in Bosnia 'We don't do choirs and football clubs' – a Bosnian criticism of the interveners' tendency to apply European models to Bosnian "civil society".

Expanding on the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina is insightful for understanding how the "Civil Society Development" approach has mismanaged accounts of legitimate and efficient peacebuilding strategies. Indeed, faced with criticism of neo-imperialism, especially due to its continuous status as a protectorate since 1995, most foreign interveners have now turned towards a civil society development approach (Fagan 2005: 406), presenting a strategy for bypassing the Bosnian political stagnation, widely created by the Dayton Peace Agreement (Fagan 2005). However, the record is far from successful, varying greatly throughout BiH, and the concept of civil society is itself poorly understood (see Žerąvčić and Biščević 2009).

Of the estimated 12,000 Bosnian CS-organisations, only 6,600 are active (UNV 2011: 8). In 2003, 60/8,000 were deemed "strong"– confirming Belloni's (2001: 177-178) argument that a mushrooming of local NGOs is not necessarily a panacea. Development agendas nonetheless continue to romanticise civil society. A UNV (2011: 7) Report, for example, argues that Bosnian civil society 'contributes to *cohesion* and *democracy* through delivering vital

social services' or 'increase[s] *social trust* and enhance *social inclusion* and *reconciliation* in the country'. The reality in BiH seems fairly different as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are mostly divided along ethnic, religious and national lines (Belloni 2008: 97). Moreover, CSOs efficiency is also contested. Dmitrović (2011) explains that most organisations are not particularly peacebuilding oriented or promotional (e.g. UNV 2011: 8: 19% of them are sports organisations). Whilst they do provide social services – a humane life is the first prerequisite for sustainable peacebuilding – NGOs and the civil sector have been so strongly encouraged by the West to be purely technical and strongly apolitical that barely any think-tanks exist (Žerąvčić and Biščević 2009: 145), and an overall inability 'to challenge dominant political discourse or to mobilise significant political support' prevails (Sørensen 1997: 35).

With only a minority of the overall population (4.5%) (UNDP 2009: 10) involved in formal volunteering, the representativeness of CSOs is questioned both demographically – only a limited number of CSOs have offices in both entities, and they tend to be mono-ethnic (Brljavac, 2011, para.11) – and regarding the population's needs. Indeed, a UNV Report (2011: 10) shows that civil society is still viewed with indifference, disengagement and/or mistrust by a majority of the Bosnians. As CSOs depend on external funds (UNV 2011: 9; Fagan 2005: 410), their independence and "legitimate" nature is often jeopardised. The normative power of funding is reflected in EU's peacebuilding activities in Bosnia (Kappler and Richmond 2011; Kappler 2013). Indeed, the EU has a very selective view of what counts as "civil society/NGOs", what does not, and what agency areas are to be supported. Ethnicity for example has been at the centre of EU's and other external actors' focus (Kappler and Richmond 2011: 265; Kappler 2013: 15; Richmond 2011: 76), at the expense of other social problems. Moreover, only certain NGOs receive funding. MESS's (famous for its theatre festivals) cultural project about EU-related issues did not receive financial aid, despite potentially having a huge impact on the public discourse regarding EU membership. The reason, Kappler (2013) explains, is the non-usage of traditional civil society methods (workshops, conferences, etc.), preferring instead the visualisation of EU-related issues via architectural artwork in Sarajevo – a fate shared by many less-coordinated cultural agents (museums, choirs, etc.). Only libero-normative projects (such as Human Rights training for teachers, which was one of the only projects the Nansen Dialogue Centre in Mostar received funding for; Kappler and Richmond 2011: 267) are supported, despite the fact that "Western" human rights concepts are highly contested in Bosnia and that cultural arenas can have a very positive and sustainable impact on peacebuilding (see Kappler 2013; Kollontai 2010).

To summarise, it appears that power remains in the hands of international actors, as they define the needs of state and citizens and the overall goal of peacebuilding according to those needs; but also the framework as a whole, structuring the reality of war-ridden countries according to some Western concepts. As such, it seems merely concerned with a 'practical change of strategy, [rather than a] more fundamental de-centring of foundational ontology of orthodox peace, [and] epistemological primacy of [its] overarching meta-narrative' (Randazzo 2015: 82). In BiH, while the civil society development model can claim some successes, the sector's widely ethnically divided nature and reliance on foreign funding and administrative skills have inhibited its recognition by the Bosnian population as legitimate, mirroring the Bosnian state in many respects. As Kappler and Richmond (2011: 274) write, 'the failure of [external interventions] so far in Bosnia can partly be ascribed to the fact that large numbers of "uncomfortable" voices have been mostly excluded'. This means that the first local turn has not fulfilled its goal of legitimacy and efficiency building, which the second local turn, as the next chapter will discuss, aims to achieve by means of a more localised and agency-driven "local".

4   Re-conceptualising "Local" "Ownership" or the Reality of Subaltern Agency: the Management of Effects

This chapter will argue that the second turn, despite moving from "causing change" to a "management of effect", by acknowledging the inherent power and legitimacy in local agency, still reflects a very narrow understanding of the nature of both "effects" and "management", reiterating normative discourses it had sought to challenge.

Dissatisfied with persistently low levels of (formal) local ownership, the second local turn came to question the ontological assumptions which had nourished the discipline so far. Fundamentally, it criticised discourses of "genuine" ownership, which, counter-intuitively, implied that real ownership could be assigned to people (Richmond 2012). Instead, it explored what *kind* of power the local/subaltern agency owns, based on the acknowledgment that it *already* possesses power. By describing reality (What is being done? Where does power lie?) instead of prescribing it (What should be done? Who should have power?), the turn opened up a 'space for a new ontology of peace that can reflect the agency of the local, beyond the stereotypes of the liberal peace' (Randazzo 2015: 8), disclosing 'opportunities to think differently about the relationship between [the ontologies of] power, agency and freedom' (Hughes et al. 2015: 818-19).

Heretofore, the role of subaltern power in shaping and building peace independently of, or in reaction to international peacebuilding, had been neglected. Now, power lied everywhere and under every form, as characterised by three shifts, namely: 1) Reconceptualising terminology such as power, authority, "local", ownership, from being static concepts (nouns) to processes (verbs); 2) De-mystifying these same concepts, by unveiling their banality and ubiquity. 3) De-territorialising these concepts by revealing the hybrid nature of any agency. Thereby, the local became agency; state-/peacebuilding became state-/peace formation; and intervention became management.

Applying an "agency" lens to the conceptualisation of the local defies its portrayal as 'static, rural…waiting to be civilised' (Mac Ginty 2015: 841), an 'empty space' (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 765) rendered part of the international peacebuilding script, thus challenging 'ontological assumptions of the liberal meta-narrative…[which do not pay] attention to the breadth and depth of subjectivities' (Richmond 2008: 450). Indeed, the "local" consists of processes, activities, interactions, networks, etc., evolving from being a noun to a verb (Mac Ginty 2015: 848). Emblematic of this approach is the "everyday" – a new

ontological space according to Randazzo (2015: 89). Inspired by Michel DeCerteau (2006[1984]), it is the 'set of experiences, practices and interpretations through which people engage with daily challenges of occupying, preserving, altering and sustaining the plural worlds that they occupy' (Mitchell 2011: 1624). It reflects the idea that "peace is behavioural", being ingrained, as Boulding (2000) and Mitchell (2011) explain, in Levinasian (1969[1961]) ideas of caring, interpersonal exchange, face-to-face interactions and social formation. Inherently, it re-draws the dynamics of peace towards conflict transformation (Lederach 2015), displaying the multiple ontologies of peace and agency.

Often accused of banality and impotence, the "local local" (Richmond 2009: 325) in contrary reveals the banality of power and authority processes in peacebuilding practice, by uncovering their ubiquity as dimensions of human experience (Mitchell, 2011). Bliesemann De Guevara (2010), and Pogodda and Richmond (2015), for example, introduce the concept of "state-formation". As a 'dynamic…process by which states emerge in relation to societies', state-formation represents a 'crucial form of grassroots agency' (Pogodda and Richmond 2015: 890). In developing new ways of thinking about the state – as produced through everyday practices and encounters, or through cultural representations and performances (see Gupta 1995) – it challenges old static ontologies of "state". In a post-conflict environment, the everyday can also foster societal consensus and unity; conduct public diplomacy; mitigate inequalities and support everyday life; assume state functions; or as Scott (1998) and Heathershaw (2009) show, adapt top-down, exogenous ordained institutions and projects to local contexts, counter-balancing their shortcomings in terms of service provision. In other words, state-formation does not exist in a void, implemented top-down, and immune to change, but is rather a process that occurs not only on the administrative level, but also in the "hearts and heads" of citizens. The state is embodied in everyday agencies; and the creational power lies as much in national and international bodies as in the hands of citizens. As a result, deeply acknowledging that external interventions cannot build the state (or peace), the concern shifts towards managing and dealing with the effects of state/peace-formation.

Removed from a physical topography, Mac Ginty (2015: 849) stresses that 'territory has increasingly become post-territorial', in that the ideas people associate with localities, the importance given to them, and the ways these are captured in their discourses, ways of life, etc., establishes "space" and not vice versa. "Local" is indeed always fluid, created and re-created in all spheres of interactions, and even "locals", which seemed clearly defined or non-existing, can suddenly be redefined or created – e.g. Bosnia's "ethnic" entities 1992-1995 and post-1995. To paraphrase Sartre (1958 [1943]: 568), the local's existence precedes its essence.

This existence is hybrid (see Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). No actor (local, national, international) can genuinely act autonomously. The "environment" lived and built by any agent is constantly shaped by others (Van Tongeren et al. 2005: 391) in an 'interplay of: powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; ability of local actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace interventions; and ability of local actors, networks and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking' (Mac Ginty 2010: 391). This interplay is also visible in local resistance. 'Malfeasance and non-cooperation, foot-dragging,…desertation, feigned ignorance,…arson or sabotage' (Paffenholz 2015: 865), which commonly exhibit a "primordial" mode of local agency, are actually resisting "something" exogenous, exposing the pervasive presence of international actors. What hybridity reveals to international peacebuilding actors is that local acts of critical or resistive agency should not be seen as undermining peacebuilding efforts. Rather, they are a source of inspiration, an input to development strategies. Understanding how international and domestic forces interact in post-conflict settings and how peacebuilding structures and processes emerge out of this interplay engages projects more dynamically with local society (Donais 2009: 5; Kappler and Richmond 2011: 270) - changing and shaping their epistemology.

Aware that any external peacebuilding project results in unintended side effects, interventions now focus on managing and governing the '*effects* rather than seeking to address ostensible root *causes*' (Chandler 2015: 71, italics added). Problems 'cannot be dealt with merely at the level of causation, by identifying and categorising them[…]in the reductionist terms of cause and effect'(Chandler 2015: 78). Instead, drawing on complexity theory (see Ramalingam et al. 2008) which reveals the interconnectedness and interdependence of elements in a system, peacebuilding practice needs to approach social processes as a holistic and 'homeopathic form of policy intervention designed to enhance autonomous processes rather than undermine or socially engineer them' (Chandler 2015: 77). Consequently, as expressed in the 2013 updated UK DFID Growth and Resilience Operational Plan,[6] interventions are reconceptualised as outside of the realm of policy-making – where one does not *solve*, but *observes* and *manages*.

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[6] 'We will produces less "supply-driven" development of product, guidelines and policy papers, and foster peer-to-peer, horizontal learning and knowledge exchange,[…] to promote the widest interaction between stakeholders' (DFID 2013: 8)

Nonetheless, this critical ontology reveals many inaccuracies. Firstly, whilst subaltern agencies exist within "peace", their relation to structural, international, and transnational factors and powers is more defined by powerlessness than power to tackle them (Heitmeyer 2009:114; Paffenholz 2015: 866). This inaccuracy also means, as Mohan and Stokke (2000: 247) and Chandler (2013a, b) stress, that these structural forces remain unaddressed, abrogating the responsibility of international actors to assist peacebuilding. Secondly, the ontology of local agency is incomplete. Paffenholz (2015: 862) stresses that it is far more diverse than usually represented and extends beyond the new 'romanticised local cultures' (Kappler and Richmond 2011: 265), which again are instrumentalised to give interventions an impression of authenticity. Without a critical assessment of *who* and *what* the local represents, 'the *normative* regime behind the local turn, [which] is rhetorically denied in favour of ontologically plural framework, although [in selecting] *what* forms of agency to valorise and *how to do so*, expresses a preference or value judgments regarding the desirability of some forms over others' (Randazzo 2015: 192-193), will remain hidden.

Beyond wondering 'who gets to decide what is local and what is not?', exploring epistemologically 'Who determines who is an outsider or insider?' presents the biggest difficulty (Hughes et al. 2015: 821). In many ways, the "local" may be more transnational or global than local. And even then, what do these concepts mean? Is this binary opposition useful?[7] These questions will be approached and further developed in the next and final section. For now, the problematic and potential obsoleteness of the "local" means that even an effect-based approach is still victim of "othering", seeing the international and the local as two distinct, alien entities, not only disregarding all knowledge non-local actors can bring, but also omitting all structural forces acting behind the scene.

Victim of this reduction to a passive "other", the Bosnian public is often regarded as apolitical and apathetic as a result of 20 rather unsuccessful years of peacebuilding (Richmond 2012). However, this description is too simplistic and inaccurate, portraying the Bosnian population as either static and as a victim of circumstances/international intervention, or as an obstacle/inhibitor of the peacebuilding process. Recent demonstrations and other forms of activism, such as the February 2014 Tuzla protests and riots or the 2012 Picin park demonstrations (Gilbert and Mujanović 2015) present, despite limited impact (Lippman 2014a:

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[7] See Paffenholz (2015).

29-30; Toe 2016), an important source of political agency, expressing – frustration over the current situation and – willingness to do something about it.

The plenums, which emerged subsequent to the 2014 protests, demonstrate the second turn's relocation and the de-mystification of "creational power". To an (limited) extent, plenums transformed the Bosnian political field, disclosing citizens as 'political subjects in contemporary BiH' (Gilbert and Mujanović 2015: 609) with an 'ability to self-organise and independently analyse the political and social hurdles the country was facing' (Majstorović et al. 2015: 668). This was seen during the May 2014 floods where, in contrast to the inability of the government to provide disaster relief, the plenums promoted 'unprecedented grass-roots humanitarian work that cross all ethno-territorial boundaries' (ibid.); or in the ability to re-evaluate different EU programmes, such as the Compact for Growth and Jobs in BiH which, according to the "Movement for Social Justice Sarajevo", fails to address economic policies concerning industrial (under)development, focusing instead on labour costs, whilst offering only austerity measures (Majstorović et al. 2015: 675). Outside of the direct political realm, Kappler (2013: 12) describes the state-formation potential of the cultural arena, which 'represen[ts] microcosms of legitimacy and produc[es] social contracts that are responsive to people's everyday experiences'. The Youth Theatre in Sarajevo or the theatre festival MESS aim at connecting their performances to social or political problems, rendering the 'processes which appear distant and meaningless in the public sphere touchable in private spheres in terms of connecting them to people's lives' (Kappler 2013: 20). In processes of presentation, representation, transformation, visualisation, etc. the cultural arena shapes public perception, 'evoking a critical consciousness' (Kappler 2013: 20).

Peacebuilding can also be exhibited by and embodied in everyday acts. A remarkable example of such agency is the resettlement of displaced people (DPs), especially where no international support was provided (Lippman 2015). In Prijedor (Belloni, 2005), thousands of Muslim DPs returned to an overly Serbian constituency, despite all discouragement by the international community. This had two political impacts: 1) it pressed for an agenda of return for refugees and displaced persons (Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 7 – right to return) in face of international community's resistance, and 2) by participating fully in the social, political and economic life of the society (see Pickering 2006), the returnees eventually side-lined the hitherto ruling nationalist parties of Prijedor, leading to the emergence of moderate politicians (Pickering 2006: 445-46). This proved that grassroots, everyday efforts can normalise life in "ethnically-divided" Bosnian communities. In Kopaci in 1999, in an effort of realising the right to return, tents with hand-painted signs "Kopaci is the key to Annex 7" (Lippman 2015: 30)

were put on a hill for everyone – especially the international community – to see. Subsequently, international support grew (Lippman 2015) and the Reconstruction and Return Task Force began promoting the view that international efforts should follow the flow of DPs and not vice versa (Belloni 2005: 442).

The examples presented above are only a sample of Bosnian agency and potential. Nevertheless, they present the idea of appropriating and localising exogenous interventions, translating policy agendas into the local context. The biggest effort of the international community has been the restoration of pre-war multi-ethnicity, omitting that this alleged multiculturalism was rather a 'plural mono-culturalism' (Bliesemann 2009: 22). What the Bosnian population has instead been capable of is the opening up to new ontologies of peace, showing that in post-war life 'the theme permeating…was rather the striving for sense of normality- not so much consciously engaging in inter-ethnic reconciliation, as by invoking and practicing widely shared norms such as those of economic security and neighbourhood sociality' (Eastmond 2010: 12).

In summary, the second turn has shifted the conceptualisation of peacebuilding intervention from "solutionism" to "management", relocating its concern to the "effects" rather than the "causes" of peacebuilding. Agency has been de-mystified and "banalised", acknowledging the importance and reality – everydayness – of subaltern agency in its resistive as well as emancipatory form. This has been accompanied by wide epistemic changes, reassessing knowledge claims, concepts such as authority, power, local, ownership, as well as where knowledge lies regarding these concepts and how it can be gained. However, the effects-oriented approach exposes certain weaknesses: uncritical romanticisation of the local, omission of wider structural forces and consequent abrogation of international responsibility, or the problematic definition and existence of the concept "local". While the second turn offers a further stage of rupture with Western neo-colonialist peacebuilding strategies and presents useful insights into understanding post-conflict settings, linearity, normativity and staticity still remain to be transcended.

5 Beyond the local turn

It seems that the local turn so far retains the idea of *linear/cause-effect* methods, subject to different normatively sanctioned epistemologies (liberal or endogenous) and implemented by defined actors (local or global) which are *Cartesianly* opposed to and govern a static ontological field constituted of clear "building bricks". Whilst these orientations have been widely criticised in the academic literature, criticism has mostly focused on the descriptions and representations of phenomena, rather than the methodology itself. In other words, I argue that the problem is not simply the understanding of the phenomena, but firstly the understanding of what it is to understand phenomena. Indeed, the hitherto linear, normative, and static models are shown to be incorrect as they rely on a Cartesian subject-object dichotomous understanding of one's (here the peacebuilding agent's) relation to the world and therefore access to knowledge about it. For this end, the usefulness of phenomenology to peacebuilding is explored in terms of altering and sophisticating 'the way that things are perceived in analysis and done in the field' (Hendrick 2009: 2).[8]

Defined as the study of the structures and essential properties of experience or consciousness from a first-person view (Moran 2000), phenomenology is concerned with the ways things (i.e. phenomena) appear and the meanings they have in our experience. Key to phenomenology is the transcendence of the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy where reason and knowledge are decontextualized and objective. Inspired by Husserl's lifeworld (1970[1936]), both Latour's (1993, 2005) objectualism and Harman's (2010) object-oriented philosophy posit objects and subjects as existing in a monist plane where every entity (humans included) is an object. In this horizontal plane where humans remain agents and conscious experiencers of phenomena, any experience is always already "experienced" in a world which does not simply surrounds us – assemblage of objects or things – but presents already the possible condition for our experience and the background against which we experience (as in

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[8] Whilst both Bourdieu's theory of practice (1977) and Gidden's structuration theory (1984) propose a way to overcome the structure/agency dichotomy, phenomenology – on which both theorist draw – has a long tradition in offering an orientation to social matter, and its comprehension, which arguably deconstructs more fundamentally the "subject/object" dichotomy, providing an approach to understanding what it is to "be", in terms of embeddedness in a meaningful environment.

live) our lives (see Heidegger 1962[1927]) – a being-in-the-world. It is a web of functional and meaningful relations between all entities of beings, conscious or non-conscious.

Beyond experience, Husserl (1970) and his successors introduced the idea that 'the lifeworld is the meaning-fundament that *thinking* presupposes and the horizon in which thinking takes place' (Zelić 2009: 417). Understanding, thinking, and therefore knowledge, is not "exophysical" but "endophysical" (Morçöl 2005: 3). Indeed, human consciousness and existence is at the centre of the knowledge process. As opposed to objectivist science which separates knowledge from the knowing subject and objectifies "external reality" where the subject loses touch with the reality he/she lives in (Hummel 1994: 209), phenomenology explains that due to our being-in-the-worldness, our knowledge is necessarily endophysical, within a world. We cannot transcend this world as our knowledge is embodied, 'rooted in the corporeal dimension of existence that is always situated in concrete lived experience' (Chamberlain 1993: 423).[9] Whatever we "know", we know it from within a world/environment we inhabit.

What is the implication for linearity? Linearity is made possible by the Cartesian/Enlightenment belief that an exophysical subject can objectively analyse phenomena, theorise and *then* implement methods on an objectified environment – a Newtonian, linear scientific schema common in peacebuilding practice. However, not only is the phenomenon so complex so that one can never account for the totality of relations between the entities which make it up (see Ramalingam et al. 2008: chapter 3; Hendrick 2009), but also must one recognise that the peacebuilders/researchers enter the conflict phenomenon/system, thus becoming part of it (Hendrick 2009:2, 4). As part of the phenomenon, they can not only never see beyond (or the totality of) it and can therefore not make any causal claims about it; they are also part of any relation/"cause-effect" network active in the phenomenon/system, being themselves initiator and receiver of relations. This involvement (as receiver and initiator) in the phenomenon occurs at the level of conscience, of being-in-the-*system*. Therefore, there is a practice of the environment on the subject in terms of being taken "conscience of". This is why any change, as phenomenology reveals, can only happen from within an environment; and any actor is only as susceptible of changing the environment as the environment allows for change, as it constitutes the background and thus the possibility for action.

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[9] On embodiment also see Merleau-Ponty (1962[1945]).

Linearity therefore becomes obsolete, because every linear action from agent to a post-conflict phenomenon is already made possible by a "link back" – or myriads of them – consisting of the rise into awareness of a phenomenon for the agent, which is meaningful only within the environment constitutive of and constituted by the agent and the phenomenon. Intentional "causalistic" theorising is possible, but conceiving of peacebuilding as a "linear" practice omits the complexity of pre-theorisation influences and removes the peacebuilding agent and researcher from the environment in which he/she/it exists, lives (i.e. interacts) (see Hameiri 2011: 17), and which constitutes the necessary possibility for action.

Normativity is justified by the belief of someone having privileged access to knowledge of the everyday or superior methodological skills regarding effective peacebuilding. However, as everything and everyone is placed on the same terrain, vertical hierarchies flatten. Mitchell (2011: 1624) explains that the '"everyday" is not a specific level of human organisation, but rather a dimension of human experience which takes place at every level of analysis'. From the moment where an individual concerns itself with post-conflict phenomena, he/she, as a local actor or international intervener, comes to share a being-in-the-world, an "everyday" with every other entity constitutive of it. Therefore, in a post-conflict everyday 'international administrators…are no longer considered godlike subjects, who govern other objects… [nor] loyal subjects, who adopt a secondary role to support, empower or strengthen other objects' (Bargués-Pedreny n.d.: 6). Instead they are like every other objects: they 'are not users or used, they are' (Bargués-Pedreny n.d.) – with the same status, structure, and access to understanding the post-conflict everyday as local actors and everyday objects – and vice versa.

Transcending normativity does not mean that it is impossible to 'tell international peacekeepers from local militia' (Heathershaw 2013: 5) and to not differentiate the understanding they will have of the same phenomenon. Gadamer (1960) instead presses us to realise how any of our understanding is prejudiced and a product of our tradition. "Understanding" cannot be achieved if we try to extract ourselves from the past or our current context, that is, the interpretive frameworks that make possible that we think and experience *at all*, as knowledge must be understood as always already part of a lifeworld. Accepting this requires all actors to engage in reflexivity, which necessitates, as Schierenbeck (2015: 1030) argues, the 'accept[ance] and recogni[tion] that [academics and peacebuilders] are not neutral or objective, but instead deeply embedded in their own history and perspectives'. And as every understanding is prejudiced, there is no justification for any normative preferential between one epistemology or the other, as they all only reflect a certain "Husserlian"/"Gadamerian" facet of the non-exhaustive myriad of realities, i.e. horizons, constituting the phenomena that

no observation wholly encompasses (Fristed 2010: 483). Bargués-Pedreny (n.d.: 5) writes that 'the reality of the object always runs deeper, silent, indecipherable. When someone observes, uses or analyses the object, reduces it to a mere caricature'. Yet, instead of rejecting all these epistemological lifeworlds, it is necessary to value them all and allow for a genuine dialogue between them, so as to create a "fusion of horizons" (Gadamer 1960) which will step-by-step, possibly never fully, illuminate post-conflict reality.

It is in merging the above-gained insights regarding linearity and normativity that staticity becomes obsolete. Firstly, the static dichotomy "local/global" that made the local "turn" possible crumbles.[10] This does not mean that all actors are identical, but rather that in so far as local militia and external intervener engage in peacebuilding, their position vis-à-vis and within the process lies on the same horizontal plane. Secondly, concepts such as "state", "human security" or "peace" gain a nature of their own which, following Harman (2010:160), exists as 'a unified reality that no external observation can exhaust'. Any static, clear-cut definition – and claim to possessing one – is obsolete as it can impossibly express the entity's whole nature. Thirdly, staticity is also overcome in realising that everything is practice, "lived", "experienced". A post-conflict environment, and all elements constitutive of it, is not an objectified sphere built or to be built with building-blocks and tools, but rather a "lifeworld". Emerge then the meaningful relations constitutive of post-conflict everyday, enabling to understand, for example, the significance of "borders" in post-conflict phenomena. Van Houtum et al. (2005:3) explain that 'a border is not so much an object or a material artefact as a belief, an imagination that creates and shapes a world, a social reality'. As Palmberger (2013:545) notes in light of her study of border-crossing in the ethnically-divided city of Mostar: a border often has two faces, being either an obstacle to be overcome, or associated with protection and safety. Whilst time-consuming, thorough qualitative research, as well as the use of methods which allow for diverse, participatory modes of expression by the focus population (e.g. arts), opens the door to understanding for example how such seemingly trivial elements/objects of the environment are constituent factors of people's everyday lives. This can help peacebuilders grasp the reality of post-conflict societies, and understand what needs to be done in the ways individuals perceive, make sense of, or value factors promoting or

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[10] See e.g. Sabaratnam (2011), Paffenholz (2015), and Schierenbeck (2015) for a critique.

inhibiting peacebuilding processes. Every element is part of a process and, by nature of rising to the consciousness of peacebuilding agents, becomes process itself.

In summary, the issues of peacebuilding practice which have been outlined in the two previous chapters have here been shown to link back to a more primary "mis"-understanding of what it is to *understand* phenomena. A new approach could offer, instead of a Cartesian subject-object dichotomous understanding of one's relation and cognitive access to the world, a redefined and re-designed "being-in-the-world": as a web of functional and meaningful relations between all entities of beings, conscious and non-conscious. Consequently, assumptions of linearity, normativity, and staticity shaping peacebuilding practice in regards to that world, do, as explained in this chapter, no longer hold ground. The implementation of such a cognitive change would require a new orientation of peacebuilders, analysts and officials to what it means to understand, interact with, and aim to change a post-conflict environment. Which methods will best implement such a change of thought is left at the discretion of the individual. Whilst this leans towards seeming to be a "non-practical" solution, a turn towards phenomenology might lead towards acknowledging that there currently is no unique grand narrative which could inspire straightforward peacebuilding methods.

6 Conclusion

At the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on the 25th September 2015, the 193-Members of the UN General Assembly formally adopted the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Opening with the audacious claim to be 'a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity [which] seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom' (UN 2015:para.1), it is in many ways an ode to the local turn's ideals of sustainable and localised peacebuilding. However, what was true at the outset of the local turn certainly still is today. Past and current interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Libya are failing or have failed and the prospects of future post-conflict states like Iraq or Syria are worrying. This is why there is a need, maybe more pressing than ever before, to refine and to rethink approaches and tools used for understanding and gaining knowledge about local actors, agency, and post-conflict reality.

Local forms of resistance and agency have been present all along BiH's post-Dayton journey. Yet, their efficiency has been stunted by a thorough top-down intervention, unfavourable economic circumstances, as well as a Peace Agreement which determines the horizon of, and barriers to, political change. It is however the omission that those forms of agencies, even if widely limited, provide insightful alternatives to, or critics of, the intervention agenda, that has slowed the peacebuilding process so greatly. Acknowledging that all types of agency are a meaningful and significant expression of a certain lifeworld, which is also constitutive of a post-conflict reality, could provide a first step towards an evaluation of interventions.

Admittedly, the local turn has been an insightful and necessary undertaking, challenging traditional liberal peacebuilding theory and practice, rooting legitimacy and power in the "local", thereupon advocating a crucial position for local agency in the peacebuilding processes. As it evolved, the local turn sketched the relationship between the international, the society intervened in and the problem in question according to its understanding of the "local" as either legitimacy/efficiency or as agency; but also its presuppositions regarding the cause/effect relation. So doing, it has impacted on the nature and location of power, authority, and legitimacy in peacebuilding. The first strand, "local as legitimacy", regarded civil-society-as-NGOs – the epitome of the liberal ideal of democratic participation and civility – to be the key to localised and sustainable peacebuilding. Focused on causing change from below, it however re-instigated a normative "liberal meta-narrative" which romanticised civil society in both its legitimacy and efficiency, further portraying it as a mediator between the local/global

binary, without granting it any agency of its own. The second strand aimed to move away from both causality and normativity. Acknowledging that peacebuilding effects are too complex to be engineered and that the actual engineering was already taking place in an "everyday" of post-conflict society (e.g. state-formation), it contributed three ontologically informed shifts to the discipline, namely: 1) Reconceptualising terminology such as power, authority, "local", ownership, from being a "noun" to being a "verb"; 2) De-mystifying these same concepts by unveiling their banality and ubiquity; 3) De-territorialising them by revealing the hybrid character of any agency. However, in its essentialisation of the "West" and its romanticisation of "local agency" (again according to legitimacy and efficiency), it reiterated the normative discourses it had sought to challenge – as the examples from Bosnia have shown. More generally, despite ground-breaking developments, linearity, normativity and staticity still prevail in processes of conceptualisation and theorising due to an erroneous understanding of what it is to *understand* peacebuilding practice and post-conflict phenomena.

Indeed, the problem is not primarily the understanding of peacebuilding processes and post-conflict reality, which is only symptomatic of a deeper issue consisting of an erroneous methodology regarding the acquirement of knowledge. If the question has been: 'How does the acknowledgment of the local translate into peacebuilding practice and theory"?, with "local" in terms of actors, endogenous knowledge, etc., the local has now turned towards being understood as "lived experience" and "everyday", i.e. the background and environment against and within which we live; or the source and the possibility of all our knowledge and understanding. Instead of conceiving of knowledge as exophysical and the knowing subject as Cartesianly detached from the objects of this world, human consciousness and existence is placed at the centre of the knowledge process and becomes 'rooted in the corporeal dimension of existence that is always situated in concrete lived experience' (Chamberlain 1993: 423). As has been explained in Chapter 4, linearity, normativity, and staticity become superfluous in a horizontal world where everything is practice, meaningful, and interrelated. In rethinking the question, the attention turns to altering and sophisticating 'the way that things are perceived in analysis and done in the field' (Hendrick 2009: 2), in terms of 'the very epistemological and ontological premises that form the corpus of knowledge employed in thinking about peace[building]' (Randazzo 2015: 90).

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